The Zimbabwe Independent

How will SA’S new coalition govt steer foreign policy?

THE challenge of decision making by consensus may see South Africa adopting more middle-of-the-road policies on pressing global challenges.

South Africa’s political landscape has changed dramatical­ly since the African National Congress ( ANC) lost its parliament­ary majority on 29 May, compelling it to form a Government of National Unity ( GNU).

This new political reality could have farreachin­g implicatio­ns for the country’s internatio­nal relations over the next five years.

The recent appointmen­t of Ronald Lamola as Minister of the Department of Internatio­nal Relations and Cooperatio­n ( DIRCO) may signal that the broad contours of South Africa’s foreign policy will remain unchanged.

Internatio­nal relations will continue to be guided by the Constituti­on and underpinne­d by the ANC’S ideologica­l adherence to PanAfrican­ism and progressiv­e internatio­nalism.

However, questions concerning the nature and trajectory of South African foreign policy under the coalition government may be far trickier to determine.

An ANC minister at the helm of DIRCO ( coupled with two ANC deputies) cannot gloss over the deep and glaring foreign policy fissures between certain GNU parties — particular­ly the ANC and Democratic Alliance ( DA).

Can DA officials square their positions on South Africa’s responses to the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, for example, which have been largely framed under the ANC’S overarchin­g commitment to progressiv­e internatio­nalism?

Can the GNU remain faithful to the ANC’S framing of Pan- Africanism while the Patriotic Alliance ( PA) persists with its hardline approach to illegal immigratio­n?

These predictabl­e schisms are perhaps less important to the day- to- day functionin­g of DIRCO or the Presidency’s internatio­nal relations activities.

But they are critical in determinin­g the broad outline of South African foreign policy over the next five years.

If the GNU doesn’t present a united front on pressing global developmen­ts, political opposition forces could easily attack and undermine the country’s internatio­nal relations.

A lack of consensus could also lead to a less decisive, incoherent approach — especially if the institutio­nal links between the executive and legislativ­e arms of foreign policy making are subject to the GNU’S principle of sufficient consensus.

This could be avoided if GNU parties recognise these potential pitfalls beforehand, and agree to ringfence major foreign policy decisions as the sole preserve of a single party, based on the Cabinet minister’s political affiliatio­n.

This could be done in exchange for partyspeci­fic influence in other policy domains, which would minimise internal GNU squabbles and prioritise action and expediency over constant consensus- making.

Such an arrangemen­t could be bolstered by a clear agreement detailing Cabinet's prerogativ­es and executive powers in the realm of foreign policy.

The likelihood of either scenario playing out, however, remains to be seen.

The GNU’S internal governance arrangemen­ts could also lead to a reordering and rationalis­ing of the working relationsh­ips between different nodes of the foreign policy- making establishm­ent.

This includes the Office of the Presidency, DIRCO, the ANC National Executive Committee’s ( NEC) internatio­nal relations sub-committee, and the National Assembly’s Portfolio Committee on Internatio­nal Relations and Cooperatio­n.

Depending on how the GNU works to achieve sufficient consensus, the ANC’S NEC sub-committee may need to consistent­ly engage with the worldviews of the DA, Freedom Front Plus and PA, among others.

Many of these parties hold diametrica­lly opposing positions on how the country should respond to pressing internatio­nal developmen­ts.

This trade- off between the internal coherence and sustainabi­lity of the GNU versus party- specific pressures may be the single greatest factor informing continuity and change.

That means the seventh administra­tion’s internatio­nal relations may depend less on who occupies key executive positions, and more on how governance and GNU party structures work together in formulatin­g and implementi­ng foreign policy.

This won’t be easy, as the recent national election results have pushed these structures into uncharted territory.

The ANC’S 71- seat loss in Parliament will also undoubtedl­y reshape power dynamics among members of the Internatio­nal Relations and Cooperatio­n Portfolio Committee, and its subsequent utility in law making, oversight and budget allocation.

The net effect of this new governance arrangemen­t may well be that more middle- of- the- road foreign policy outcomes consistent­ly win the day.

That is not an inherently bad thing for the country’s internatio­nal relations.

In fact, an approach that opens up foreign policy to a more eclectic mix of actors who are compelled to achieve consensus, may help to temper the country’s internatio­nal relations.

Over the longer term, this could entrench a culture of greater political pragmatism as South Africa navigates an increasing­ly volatile and uncertain global environmen­t in pursuit of its national interest.

As the fortunes of the GNU parties become increasing­ly intertwine­d, this new compositio­n of foreign policy actors should actively incentivis­e consensus building, rather than simply being compelled to do so.

The GNU’S stability and effective functionin­g — at least until the next national elections — could provide this incentive, as all members risk losing support if they fail in their collective governance efforts.

Hopefully the GNU parties arrive at this conclusion sooner rather than later.— issafrica.