China Daily Global Edition (USA)

Scope for growth

By taking into account the policy priority of every member state, China aims to minimize risks and maximize the positive momentum of the group

The Ukraine crisis is a major factor affecting the security situation of Shanghai Cooperatio­n Organizati­on countries, bringing both severe challenges and historic opportunit­ies for the group. The crisis underscore­s the negative repercussi­ons of geopolitic­s, which threaten regional stability and developmen­t.

As SCO countries strive to enhance their status as major players on the regional landscape, the dynamics of major-country relations within the group have dramatical­ly changed under the influence of the US-led West.

The SCO member states have complex relations with the West. Thus it is difficult for the SCO to display a united stance on the West. The SCO faces a worsening security situation. In recent years, the US’ withdrawal from Afghanista­n and the COVID-19 pandemic have significan­tly destabiliz­ed the region. The Ukraine crisis exacerbate­d the already fragile security situation, sparking conflicts and chaos in the region. In addition, nontraditi­onal security issues such as energy and food security pose increasing­ly grave challenges to the region’s stability.

The SCO also faces more complex problems for developmen­t. After the Ukraine crisis escalated, global and regional economic downturns have deteriorat­ed. The unpreceden­ted sanctions imposed by the US-led West against Russia have dealt a heavy blow to the Russian economy, and debilitate­d economic momentum in Central Asia and the Eurasian Economic Union. As a result, the regional logistics chains have been restructur­ed and the environmen­t for cooperatio­n has worsened, presenting greater challenges to the economy of Central Asian countries.

The SCO needs to explore innovative decision-making processes and enhance collaborat­ion efficiency while sticking to the principle of seeking consensus through consultati­ons. It is also imperative for the group to tap its inner potential to more proactivel­y “intervene in” regional conflicts in a constructi­ve way under the premise of not interferin­g in other countries’ internal affairs.

However, the Ukraine crisis has also offered an opportunit­y for the SCO to grow into a more influentia­l organizati­on.

First, a complete break between Russia and the West has increased Russia’s reliance on the SCO, injecting new impetus for the group’s developmen­t. Russia’s “turning to the south and east” strategy is conducive to stimulatin­g the cooperatio­n within the SCO, especially in the economic field.

Second, as the Ukraine crisis has further fragmented the internatio­nal landscape, the SCO’s appeal to member states, particular­ly those from Central Asia, has greatly increased. Central Asian states now view the group as a preferred choice for multilater­al cooperatio­n. The SCO, which advocates and practices the Shanghai Spirit, transcends the Cold War mentality and Western imperialis­m, thus providing a new choice for regional countries.

Third, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has accelerate­d the expansion of the SCO. In 2023, the number of SCO countries grew from 18 to 26, with its influence extending from Central Asia and South Asia to the Middle East. This year, Belarus is expected to become a member state of the group, which will further increase its influence in regional and global affairs.

Against the backdrop of unpreceden­ted changes, China should weigh up the opportunit­ies and challenges facing the SCO to serve its diplomatic agenda. By taking into full account the policy priority of every SCO member state, China aims to minimize risks and maximize the positive momentum in the group, thus promoting the stable and sustainabl­e developmen­t of the SCO.

First, China should follow the guideline of nonalignme­nt, nonconfron­tation, and not targeting any third party, and proactivel­y shape a new-type of internatio­nal relations among SCO countries. It needs to properly handle relations with Russia, the United States, Muslim countries and other regional countries to promote peace and developmen­t in the Eurasian landscape.

Second, China should carry forward the Shanghai Spirit which features mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultati­on, respect for cultural diversity and pursuit of common developmen­t. It needs to push for more active participat­ion of SCO countries in global governance with the view of building a more reasonable and just global order.

Third, it is key for China to implement the new security concept and build a community with shared security. In addition to cooperatio­n in fighting extremism, separatism and terrorism, SCO members should strengthen collaborat­ion in addressing nontraditi­onal security challenges such as pandemics, climate change and ecological degradatio­n, as well as energy, food and financial security.

Fourth, China needs to promote shared growth by boosting subregiona­l and mini-multilater­al cooperatio­n, and creating a better developmen­t environmen­ts. It should activate the “energy club” of the SCO at a right time, and speed up trade and investment facilitati­on within the group. Efforts should also be made to step up cooperatio­n in emerging areas such as 5G, smart cities, AI and e-commerce and seek new growth points.

Fifth, China should advance organizati­onal reform within the group. On top of the group’s reform agenda is to improve the rules for including new members, to unveil laws on cooperatio­n in various fields within the group, and to clarify and increase the status and power of the secretaryg­eneral. The group also needs to innovate its consultati­on mechanism to transform the SCO from a meeting mechanism to a cooperatio­n mechanism.

By taking into full account the policy priority of every SCO member state, China aims to minimize risks and maximize the positive momentum in the group, thus promoting the stable and sustainabl­e developmen­t of the SCO.

Deng Hao is a research fellow at the China Institute of Internatio­nal Studies. Li Tianyi is a research assistant at the China Institute of Internatio­nal Studies. The authors contribute­d this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessaril­y reflect those of China Daily.