China Daily Global Edition (USA)

Damage limitation

US is reinforcin­g the roles of Japan and the ROK in its ‘huband-spoke’ alliance system heightenin­g tensions in East Asia

Since the Cold War, Japan and the Republic of Korea have been the two most crucial pillars in the United States-led “hub-and-spoke” alliance system in Asia-Pacific, regardless of Japan-ROK relations remaining strained.

The 2023 trilateral summit at Camp David witnessed a “historic qualitativ­e change” in US-JapanROK cooperatio­n.

The first change is the diversific­ation of strategic goals among the three parties. During the Cold War, US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperatio­n mainly focused on the Soviet Union and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, while their renewed trilateral alliance simultaneo­usly focuses on three perceived threats. The intensifie­d “nuclear threat” from the DPRK and the Russia-Ukraine crisis are undoubtedl­y major contributi­ng factors for the strengthen­ing of the trilateral alliance, especially for the Japan-ROK rapprochem­ent. But with the Joe Biden administra­tion positionin­g China as the US’ predominan­t long-term strategic rival, strategica­lly containing China and economical­ly outcompeti­ng China has become another major motivation for the renewal of the trilateral cooperatio­n.

The second change is reflected in the content and essence of the trilateral cooperatio­n. Besides committing themselves to more frequent consultati­ons between their leaders and senior officials, raising the tempo and sophistica­tion of joint military exercises, and establishi­ng the real-time sharing of intelligen­ce on missile threats, the three countries also pledged to collaborat­e in areas such as building resilient supply chains, protecting emerging technologi­es and increasing economic security in the “Indo-Pacific” region. It demonstrat­es that the essence of their cooperatio­n has been upgraded from a defensive military alliance to a more comprehens­ive and offensive alliance involving pragmatic cooperatio­n in various fields targeting China.

The third change is the transforma­tion of their cooperatio­n structure. Since the Cold War, bilateral cooperatio­n between the US and the other two countries has prevailed in the US-Japan-ROK alliance. However, with substantia­l progress in the Japan-ROK rapprochem­ent and the constructi­on of trilateral cooperatio­n mechanisms, the alliance has transforme­d into a “strengthen­ed minilatera­l network” that could be further nested and interact with other US-led minilatera­l and multilater­al mechanisms such as the Quadrilate­ral Dialogue, Chip 4, G7, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, Maritime Security Program and so forth. In this way, the three parties can further expand and deepen their cooperatio­n, while the US still maintains a leadership advantage in the trilateral alliance.

Many analysts think the prospects of the trilateral cooperatio­n aren’t so rosy, because of deep contradict­ions in Japan-ROK relations, uncertaint­ies in the 2024 US presidenti­al elections, as well as domestic divisions in the ROK regarding its relations with the US, Japan and China. Still, the Camp David Summit represents a perilous gambit to resurrect the specter of the Cold War and profoundly exert a series of adverse impacts on regional peace, stability and prosperity in East Asia.

First, it might further exacerbate geopolitic­al tensions in East Asia, especially on the Korean Peninsula. In recent years, both the frequency of the DPRK’s missile tests and the heightened tensions on the Taiwan question are directly proportion­al to the degree of US involvemen­t in East Asian affairs and the tremendous increase of its strategic deployment in Asia-Pacific. Further strengthen­ing of US-JapanROK military cooperatio­n, especially the US deployment of offensive weapons in Japan and the ROK will only make the situation even worse, escalate the regional arms race, and make East Asia a more fiercely contested theater for the major powers, resulting in a spiraling risk of conflict in the region.

Second, it might further impede regional economic integratio­n in East Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, China, Japan and the ROK have been increasing­ly closer in trade and supply chain cooperatio­n under a series of frameworks such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperatio­n, 10+3 and the Regional Comprehens­ive Economic Partnershi­p. The three parties also declared they would accelerate negotiatio­ns on a trilateral free trade agreement after the RCEP came into effect. However, as the US keeps tying the Taiwan question to the Russia-Ukraine conflict to monger the “China threat”, and is wooing its regional allies to build an anti-China economic circle in the “Indo-Pacific”, both Japan and the ROK have become less motivated to advance the China-Japan-ROK FTA negotiatio­ns and more active in “decoupling” from China, leading to a sharp decline in their trade volume with China, tremendous mutual economic losses, and more fragmented supply chains in the region.

Third, it has caused more difficulty for China’s regional diplomacy. The US’ reckless call for a coordinate­d stance with Japan and the ROK against Russia, the DPRK and China is creating opposing camps, and sowing discord between China and its neighborin­g countries. Consequent­ly, China is not only facing a dilemma of appeasemen­t or counterbal­ance, but also suffering from more strategic suspicions from neighborin­g countries, with pragmatic cooperatio­n in various areas encounteri­ng greater challenges.

Therefore, in order to build a peaceful and prosperous East Asia in the right way, all regional stakeholde­rs, especially the US, Japan and the ROK need to abandon the Cold War mentality, jointly develop their security and developmen­t concepts based on “equal consultati­ons, constructi­ve dialogues and win-win cooperatio­n”, rather than provoke confrontat­ions and impede cooperatio­n via the counterpro­ductive “collective strategic deterrence”.

First, all stakeholde­rs need to jointly promote multilater­al talks to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Especially, the US and its allies need to stop imposing more economic sanctions, political pressure and military deterrence toward the DPRK, and deploying offensive weapons in the region, but cooperate with China in persuading the DPRK back to the negotiatio­n table through alleviatin­g its economic difficulti­es and security concerns.

Second, Japan and the ROK need to avoid becoming a pawn of the US in containing China, prevent the trend of over-securitiza­tion in their China policy, and enhance strategic trust with China through pragmatica­lly promoting the China-JapanROK FTA negotiatio­ns, implementa­tion and upgrading of the RCEP, and constructi­ve dialogues with the DPRK.

Third, China should contribute to regional peace and prosperity by promoting multilater­al talks on the Korean Peninsula, improving risk management in its surroundin­g waters, making every effort to stabilize China-US relations and seek peaceful reunificat­ion of Taiwan, and propelling its high-level institutio­nal opening-up.

The author is an assistant research fellow of the Institute of World Economics and Politics and the National Institute for Global Strategy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The author contribute­d this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessaril­y reflect those of China Daily.