China Daily Global Edition (USA)

Tenuous connection­s

US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperatio­n mechanism will find it hard to gain traction

The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea held their first “Indo-Pacific” dialogue in Washington on Jan 5. In the subsequent joint statement, they expressed concerns about China’s claims and actions in the South China Sea. This dialogue is considered a phased outcome of institutio­nalizing trilateral cooperatio­n after the summit between the three nations at Camp David in the US.

For a long time, the US has been striving to build a trilateral alliance with Japan and the ROK. However, the ongoing tensions between Tokyo and Seoul have hindered the normalizat­ion and institutio­nalization of trilateral cooperatio­n. The “America first” foreign policy of the Donald Trump administra­tion led to fractures in alliance relations with Japan and the ROK. The inability of Japan and the ROK to manage their diplomatic conflicts resulted in the stagnation of their trilateral cooperatio­n.

The Joe Biden administra­tion initiated efforts to repair and strengthen the US’ alliance system and reshape the US’ leadership in regional and global affairs, prioritizi­ng the establishm­ent of the US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperatio­n mechanism, with the emphasis of trilateral cooperatio­n shifted from addressing the nuclear threat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to prioritizi­ng comprehens­ive strategic competitio­n with China and other strategic issues in the “Indo-Pacific”.

The US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperatio­n mechanism is based on the bilateral alliances between the US and Japan, as well as the US and the ROK. It is focused on security cooperatio­n, covering aspects including economic, political, military and technologi­cal cooperatio­n, as well as discussion­s on high-quality infrastruc­ture and supply chain resilience. After initiating its comprehens­ive strategic competitio­n with China, the US is attempting to construct cooperatio­n mechanisms and networks in as many areas and domains as possible to contain China.

However, Washington is facing limitation­s in doing so. Therefore, the Biden administra­tion hopes that Japan and the ROK will closely follow its strategic deployment­s and contribute to building multiple networks to achieve strategic goals while maintainin­g US leadership. In February 2022, the Biden administra­tion put forward its “Indo-Pacific” strategy, highlighti­ng the importance of strengthen­ing trilateral cooperatio­n with Japan and the ROK. Following the launch of the US’ “Indo-Pacific” Economic Framework for Prosperity, both Japan and the ROK applied for membership.

Leveraging the US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperatio­n mechanism, the three countries aim to enhance their comprehens­ive layout in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, serving the US strategic goals of pressuring the DPRK, containing China and countering Russia. The scope of influence is expected to expand gradually to include the entire “Indo-Pacific” region, including the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, to gain a competitiv­e advantage against China.

Moreover, the US is actively constructi­ng various other multilater­al mechanisms under the “Indo-Pacific” framework, such as the Quad, the upgraded AUKUS, the revival of US-Philippine cooperatio­n, and the establishm­ent of the US-JapanROK trilateral cooperatio­n mechanism. The US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperatio­n is expected to interact with these small multilater­al mechanisms to form a decentrali­zed and networked alliance system dominated by the US.

The constructi­on of the US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperatio­n mechanism will intensify regional bloc confrontat­ion and disrupt regional security and stability.

In Northeast Asia, the US is strengthen­ing the coordinate­d deployment and actions of the three countries’ military forces through the trilateral cooperatio­n mechanism. With the DPRK now possessing nuclear arms, the risk of conflict is increasing on the peninsula.

In the “Indo-Pacific” region, the US intends to leverage the trilateral cooperatio­n mechanism to coordinate with platforms such as the G7, AUKUS, Quad, and incorporat­e NATO into the “Indo-Pacific” strategy framework. In fact, after the Ukraine crisis, there have been higher frequency and intensity in the meetings, joint military exercises, and defense cooperatio­n between NATO countries and Japan, the ROK, India and Australia.

In the economic and technologi­cal fields, Washington, under the guise of economic security and “de-risking”, is collaborat­ing closely with Tokyo and Seoul in strategic industries and cutting-edge technologi­es. They aim to jointly establish a dominant position in the high-end industry chains and hightech fields. In doing so, they aim to reduce their dependence on China and compete for dominance in the making of regional economic and trade rules and technology standards through frameworks such as the IPEF.

Through the trilateral cooperatio­n mechanism, the US is accentuati­ng the “China threat” theory. On issues related to the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, the three countries are promoting security operations that align with their comprehens­ive strategy to exert greater pressure on China. Through the trilateral cooperatio­n, the US is ensuring that Japan and the ROK become more deeply intertwine­d with its strategy to contain China. This will certainly compress the diplomatic space of both countries, impacting the developmen­t of their relations with China. More importantl­y, the US aims to reshape the regional landscape through the trilateral mechanism, replacing the region’s focus on economic growth with a focus on “security”. As a result, China will face a neighborho­od environmen­t characteri­zed by the overstretc­hing of national security issues and bloc confrontat­ion.

However, the global power balance is shifting, and the trilateral cooperatio­n mechanism between the US, Japan and the ROK faces various constraint­s going forward.

On the one hand, the relative strength of the US is declining, and it lacks the capacity to reshape its global hegemony. The Biden administra­tion vigorously promotes a security strategy based on the US’ alliance system, constructi­ng alliance plus systems regionally and globally. This ambitious strategy, whether in terms of thinking or practical capabiliti­es, can be considered unrealisti­c.

On the other hand, the relationsh­ip between the ROK and Japan poses a significan­t obstacle to the comprehens­ive and in-depth constructi­on of the trilateral cooperatio­n mechanism. There are longterm difference­s in strategic perception­s between Tokyo and Seoul, with the two sides having weak mutual trust. There has been a lack of strong domestic support for Yoon Suk-yeol’s Japan policy. With the severe polarizati­on of political parties in the ROK, a majority of people in the ROK are not in favor of escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese political elite also harbors mistrust toward the ROK, and it maintains reservatio­ns about the process of improving bilateral relations as it involves deep reflection on historical issues. The US claims the trilateral cooperatio­n mechanism is irreversib­le, but it faces numerous challenges.

There is strong concern in both Japan and the ROK about China’s significan­t rise in comprehens­ive strength, with both countries adopting a pro-US foreign policy that alienates China. However, the two countries ultimately have complex and inseparabl­e common interests with China. Maintainin­g basic stability in relations and cooperatio­n with China remains the rational choice for both countries.

The China-Japan-ROK cooperatio­n was first initiated in 2008, aimed at building a future-oriented, all-encompassi­ng partnershi­p. Since then, trilateral progress has been intermitte­nt due to various factors, but it has not come to a complete halt. Currently, all the three countries are making efforts to restore their trilateral cooperatio­n mechanism. Additional­ly, China, Japan and the ROK have frequent business exchanges and significan­t economic interests with other Asia-Pacific countries, relying on the framework of the Regional Comprehens­ive Economic Partnershi­p for regional cooperatio­n. There is still considerab­le space for trilateral cooperatio­n among the three countries. From various perspectiv­es, the competitio­n and balance of multiple mechanisms are the major trends in the Asia-Pacific region. As a major country in the region, China has ample influence and a broad room for maneuver in this complex landscape.