Denial of weapons weakens the alliance
Türkiye had been FOR SOME TIME NOW, deprived of the benefit of procuring certain weapons from its NATO Allies. Suddenly, however, Türkiye’s fortunes appears to have improved. Last week, the Biden Administration approved the sale of new advanced F-16s and conversion kits. Although Congressional approval (or acquiescence) is still needed to finalize the sale, indications are that no objections will come from the US Congress. Rumors that the Congress will impose limitations on where the planes will fly are hopefully untrue. Equally or more significantly, Assistant Secretary of State Nuland, visiting Ankara, volunteered that Türkiye could return to the production process of F-35s and acquire them if it were to get rid of the S-400s it acquired from Russia.
Finland and Sweden suspended bans on the sale of some military ware to Türkiye after they applied for membership. Now Canada has decided to remove the ban on the sale of parts used in the optical systems of some UAVs. There is still Germany refusing to sell engines for Türkiye’s Altay tank in addition to Eurofighter jets that it produces with Britain, Spain and Italy. Engines for the tanks have been secured from Korea with the change of engine causing production delays. The importance of Eurofighters, on the other hand, have declined since the probability of getting F-16s have improved. But German hostile behavior toward Türkiye remains, though reeks of insincerity since Eurofighter sales to Saudi Arabia have been easily approved.
Banning the sale of weapons to some allies or attaching conditions to how they are used is a highly problematical dimension of intra-alliance behavior. The exclusion of Türkiye from the production of the F-35s when it decided to purchase S-400 missiles from Russia, weapons that would presumably be used against the F-35s, appears somewhat reasonable. The F-35s are to be a common weapon for the Alliance. Therefore, an ally should not purchase weapons built by rivals that may target the aircraft and learn about its secret capabilities. Even in that case, some questions may be raised if rumors that the US has also offered them to India that also buys weapons from Russia is true.
More problematical is the case when a weapon or a weapons system is produced by an ally, sold to some members of the Alliance but not to others for a variety of reasons. Most of the time, the producer is concerned that the purchaser may use the weapons for purposes that runs counter to its preferences. Within an alliance of independent states, there are always differences between the foreign policies of different members. In addition to being members of an alliance presumably formed against a common danger that all members of the alliance face, each member has its particular concerns, particular foreign policy goals other members may not share. If a member country has particular weapons that it keeps to itself and does not share with others, this may be treated as that country’s prerogative. But if a weapon or a weapon system is made available to some members of an alliance, then it should be made available to all members.
Not doing so, weakens an alliance in three major ways. First, those members to whom weapons are not sold will conclude that trust in each other among allies is lacking. In an alliance, this is a highly destructive feeling since it will generate fears that some countries will not come to the aid of others when the latter is exposed to dangers for which the alliance was established in the first instance. Furthermore, such an approach undermines alliance unity when some members feel they can force the others to abstain from actions that they do not approve of but proceed with non-alliance projects of their own. Second, those who are denied buying weapons, will try to develop the same or comparable products. This will not only prove rather costly and undermine the economy of the producer but also expand the list of products for which inter-operability must be established. Finally, at some point the member that is denied the purchase of weapons it needs may decide to get them from non-alliance sources including rivals. The problems such action may generate is well demonstrated by Türkiye’s purchase of S -400 missiles that have in fact not been rendered operational.
NATO must address the question of weapons procurement such that it is not used by some members as an instrument of imposing deprivation on others to limit their security capabilities. Not selling weapons to some members is not a sustainable policy for an alliance that wants to preserve its unity and credibility to its members and outsiders. At the moment, we are a long way from such harmony. Therefore, if I were asked for advice, I would say to the Turkish government: “For the time being, do not buy anything from Canada or Germany. Look for more reliable sources and develop your own means.”