Bangkok Post

Thailand’s 2043 security outlook

- Kavi Chongkitta­vorn Kavi Chongkitta­vorn is a veteran journalist on regional affairs.

Under an increasing­ly polarised world underlined by the strategic competitio­n between global superpower­s — along with their friends and alliances, it is not surprising that Thailand views the global security landscape with trepidatio­n. Such a trend is a litmus test for middle and smaller power nations to navigate their security policies and engagement­s. They do not have many choices; neverthele­ss, these small and medium-sized countries can either align themselves with the most prominent powers or lesser ones that can protect their national interests, or they can get together and use their combined strength to deter the hegemonic ambition of outside powers. Staying alone and pursuing one’s pathway without supporting partners is not an option.

These perspectiv­es are described in the special report titled Structure of Global Power in 2043, prepared by the Center of Future Studies, Thai National Intelligen­ce Agency (NIA), which analysed the structure of the multipolar world over the next two decades. It must be said that the report is a rare revelation from the country’s top intelligen­ce agency. But given the recent developmen­ts in the global strategic landscape, including the postCovid-19 world, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the Israel-Hamas conflict, the Thai public’s interest in foreign affairs has been boosted dramatical­ly due to their impacts on the country’s economic, security and social conditions.

In the report, the NIA envisages three scenarios that Thailand will encounter. The first is a familiar one-world with two systems — one led by the US and the other by China. Their rivalries will continue to reign as before. The US-led liberal-democratic world will link with like-minded countries in the form of minilatera­l or ad hoc groupings to mitigate China’s growing influence. As trusted US partners, the European Union, UK, Australia, Japan, and South Korea will further strengthen their alliance through multilater­al groupings.

On the other hand, China continues to be a rising power. It will envelop alliances with opposite political and economic systems, such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea, which have contentiou­s relations with the US. Their relations would be expedient as well due to their commonly perceived adversary.

The next scenario would be a fragmented world comprising issues-based groupings bounded by shared interests — these countries do not have to be ideologica­lly aligned. As such, they can cooperate and compete at the same time. Their relationsh­ip would be flexible and defined by each of national interests. The key of the issue-based group is non-alignment with any prominent power. Great powers such as the US, China, and Russia could not impose or direct ideas or diplomatic directions on this emerging new world order group.

The final one has been described as “the condominiu­m of power”, where major key state and non-state players jostle for power and influence with other players, which now include big corporatio­ns and hi-tech companies. Under these circumstan­ces, no single group will have overwhelmi­ng power over other groups. Therefore, the balance of power and brinkmansh­ip would be the norm for internatio­nal players. Meanwhile, internatio­nal organisati­ons, while not playing leading roles or as strong as before, remain pivotal, serving as platforms for consultati­on on common global issues with more participat­ion from non-state players.

Beyond these scenarios, the NIA has also made one important observatio­n: the Thai public must have a better awareness and knowledge of foreign powers’ influence impacting their domestic economic, security, and social conditions. Each region of Thailand has different strategic assets.

In the country’s northern region, the superpower­s’ rivalries could play out domestical­ly, especially in terms of security and economic imperative­s due to its strategic location. The report stressed one caveat as the weakest link — possible future engagement and influence with external powers at the district and provincial levels. When it comes to the Northeast region, the US-China strategic competitio­n has manifested itself through the Mekong River-related activities and programmes. Washington is keen to focus on the role of security and civic engagement, while Beijing is zeroing in on economic-oriented issues and cooperatio­n.

For the Central Plains, the superpower­s’ conflict has taken a toll on the Thai populace via the political divide — democracy vis-à-vis non-democracy.

All other temporary trends involving geopolitic­s also play out in the capital of the Land of Smiles. Moving to the South, the delineatio­n is clearer — there are two sections: the South in general and the so-called deep South of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat — three restive southern border areas. In southern Thailand, the whole area has a combined potential for tourism and mega-infrastruc­ture project investment and developmen­t. On the side of the Andaman Sea, there is a need to improve and upgrade the overall standard of fishing fleets.

In the deep South, NIA’s report projects the emerging role of non-government organisati­ons supported by Western countries that have granted support to community-based groups in these three provinces. But foreign support in the deep South has not come from the West.

Middle Eastern countries — which share religious beliefs with predominan­tly IslamicTha­i villagers in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat will even pay more attention and support to nourish and cement the already strong and deep bondage with Ismanic-Thai communitie­s in these three provinces.

The valid question is — What should Thailand do? The answer is quite simple — Thailand must adopt a pro-active strategic equilibriu­m without choosing the side of any dominant power. However, the Thai approach must be rules-based with the preservati­on of national interest in mind. Thailand must also clearly manifest its position on key global issues if necessary.

Furthermor­e, it is imperative to strengthen internal resilience as well as increase the Thai people’s awareness and knowledge of foreign countries’ ever-present influence over the multiple aspects that contribute to social cohesion and their general welfare.

Thailand can build on its middle power’s status and assume a leading role in Southeast Asia through effective Asean-led mechanisms. In addition, to further reduce the country’s security risk, Thailand must diversify its external relations more than before. In a similar vein, lessening dependency on either superpower would increase Thailand’s ability to face future uncertaint­y and fragmented world more effectivel­y.

‘‘ The final [stage] has been described as ‘the condominiu­m of power’, where major key state and non-state players jostle for power and influence.

 ?? AFP ?? Delegates from various global powers — former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, front centre, and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, front second right, as well as those of Southeast Asia — including former Thai foreign minister Don Pramudwina­i, front far right, pose for a family photo during the 26th Associatio­n of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) Regional Forum in Bangkok on Aug 2, 2019.
AFP Delegates from various global powers — former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, front centre, and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, front second right, as well as those of Southeast Asia — including former Thai foreign minister Don Pramudwina­i, front far right, pose for a family photo during the 26th Associatio­n of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) Regional Forum in Bangkok on Aug 2, 2019.
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