Cape Times

Capturing the youth vote in Uganda a complex task

Young people have legitimate grievances but haven’t coalesced into an electoral bloc

UGANDA is one of the youngest countries in the world, with an average age of 15.9 years. Young people aged below 30 make up about 77% of the population of 47 million people.

Young people have legitimate and wide-ranging grievances, from unemployme­nt to disenfranc­hisement. Opportunit­ies remain limited, with two-thirds of Ugandans working for themselves or doing family-based agricultur­al work.

Yet, young people in Uganda haven’t coalesced as an electoral bloc. This is despite the emergence of a presidenti­al candidate who champions youth issues. In the presidenti­al election in 2021, those aged between 18 and 30 made up 41% of the total voters roll of 18 million.

Robert Kyagulanyi, the 41-yearold musician-turned-politician, popularly known as Bobi Wine, leads the National Unity Platform. It is Uganda’s largest opposition party, known for its youth appeal.

Wine’s run at the presidency in the 2021 election highlights the reality that capturing the youth vote in Uganda is complex. And that the broad category and the role it plays in Ugandan politics is poorly understood.

As it is, the term “youth” lacks a clear definition. Uganda’s government defines the youth as those aged between 18 and 30. However, in practice, the “youth” category is much more amorphous. It tends to encompass those who are no longer considered children but haven’t yet realised the “social markers” that signify adulthood. These include financial independen­ce, marriage and children.

The outcome of the 2021 elections defied expectatio­ns, given Uganda’s large and underemplo­yed youth population and the emergence of Wine. In a recent paper, we examined youth political mobilisati­on in the election.

Despite widespread “youth wave” optimism, we identified diverse, embedded strategies and tactics from the ruling party, the National Resistance Movement, that obstructed Wine’s efforts to build a powerful national youth constituen­cy.

The strategies were:

◆ The structural capture of youth representa­tion in Ugandan politics.

◆ Diverse economic incentives for political loyalty in the form of loan schemes, grants and short-term employment.

◆ Well-spun political narratives that draw on entrenched views of youth as beholden to their elders and the state.

When Wine ran in the presidenti­al election, he was aged 38. Commentato­rs worldwide suggested his candidacy represente­d a real and unpreceden­ted threat to Yoweri Museveni’s long-standing rule. Museveni, 79, has been Uganda’s president since 1986.

Wine got 35% of the vote. This is about the same proportion of votes that has accrued to the main opposition candidates in Uganda since multiparty elections resumed in 2006.

For a new entrant on the political scene, this was an impressive achievemen­t, particular­ly in the light of political repression and patronage that make the playing field far from fair.

Wine’s violent arrest in November 2020 gained internatio­nal attention, as did the government’s aggressive response to protests calling for his release. These resulted in the death of at least 54 National Unity Platform supporters. Security forces perpetrate­d widespread violence and human rights abuses in the run-up to the election.

On the eve of the election, the government ordered a five-day internet shutdown. There were also reports of the ruling party dishing out money to potential voters, with instructio­ns to vote for Museveni.

Our research reviewed Ugandan history since its independen­ce from the British in 1962. We found that the possibilit­y of a national youth constituen­cy had been a concern of Uganda’s post-colonial government­s.

Regimes have long sought to integrate the youth into their political project, while keeping them fragmented and regionally embedded to prevent broader political mobilisati­on.

The ruling party’s use of contempora­ry tactics to co-opt the youth converges with these historical­ly rooted methods of regime consolidat­ion.

The National Resistance Movement has an elaborate set of measures in place – from state level to the villages – to prevent youth discontent from becoming a national political threat.

First, the youth are organised into a “special interest group” reinforced through quota systems. These are closely allied with the ruling party’s leadership. Political structures, such as youth MPs and representa­tives, absorb youth representa­tion under regime authority and entrench regional divisions.

Second, the ruling party uses patronage networks and tactics to mobilise young voters. It offers economic rewards for allegiance and generous material compensati­on for “party-switching” – which is when supporters defect from the opposition to the National Resistance Movement, often publicly. Before the 2021 election, Museveni gave state appointmen­ts to popular musicians with wide youth appeal who had been working closely with Wine’s party.

The ruling party also offers young people economic incentives during campaigns. These include short-term employment, loans and cash handouts. Youth are often recruited as election workers, special police constables and crime preventers. In these shortterm positions, tens of thousands of youth survey their communitie­s and share intelligen­ce with the authoritie­s, acting as the state’s eyes and ears at a village level. Among young, economical­ly precarious men, this is seen as an opportunit­y, even though they become engaged in supporting the re-election of a regime they may oppose.

Third, in the last election, campaign observers were optimistic about the power of social media to amplify Wine’s message and increase support. But social media is also a tool the National Resistance Movement uses adeptly. Beyond internet shutdowns and disinforma­tion campaigns, we found that Museveni and the National Resistance Movement used social media channels to promote powerful narratives that linked social order and prosperity to a culture of gerontocra­cy. This refers to a system of governance in which older people dominate.

Well-developed structures, practices and narratives that fragment national youth mobilisati­on have been seen in recent Ugandan history. In northern Uganda, for example, young people have lived through a recent history of devastatin­g conflict and struggle with its legacies.

This, combined with long-standing regional and ethnic tension throughout the country, means that his opponents often describe Wine first as a political agitator who could tear the country apart, not as the youth’s best chance for political liberation and progress.

Against this backdrop, if Wine contests in 2026, he will probably struggle again. He may attract global media attention, but Museveni and the National Resistance Movement are familiar with his brand of “defiance-based” opposition politics.

As commentato­rs increasing­ly note, the big question remains whether Wine and the National Unity Platform, without experience in government and in the absence of strong links to powerful military and state players, can realistica­lly achieve a political transition in Uganda.

The overall picture is one in which the elite have long seen the youth as an important resource and potential threat – and as such, fear and value them. While Uganda’s young people have real and legitimate grievances, they lack modes of political and social organisati­on – by long-standing design.

Tapscott is a lecturer at the University of York and Macdonald an associate professor of global developmen­t, University of East Anglia, in the UK.