The Taliban concern
Regardless of who has ruled Afghanistan, it has always been a problem neighbour. The Pakistani establishment may have thought the problem would be solved with the Afghan Taliban’s return to power but it has worsened. Afghanistan has become both a critical foreign policy challenge and a serious domestic policy concern.
There are many issues between the Taliban’s Afghanistan and Pakistan but the main point of contention is Kabul’s harbouring of the TTP, whose acts of terrorism against Chinese nationals and projects are hurting Pakistan’s most important relationship. Their alleged nexus with Baloch insurgents and extremist groups in former Fata threaten Pakistan’s internal security and its already fragile development prospects.
Diplomacy, economic pressure, military action, and threats of isolation have not moved the Taliban to act against the TTP. Their advice to Pakistan to talk to the TTP is an attempt to deflect pressure from themselves. They know from their own experience that such groups do not believe in talks, unless held on their terms.
There are complex reasons for their lack of action. There are ideological links between the Taliban and TTP as well as historical reasons. Even during the Raj, Afghanistan offered protection to any Pakhtun fleeing Pakhtun-majority areas in the subcontinent.
The Taliban lack both the political will and capacity to act against the TTP. They are worried about domestic threats and fissures within their own ranks. The TTP reportedly enjoy strategic affinity with the Islamic State-Khorasan and could merge with it if threatened by the Taliban, taking disaffected Taliban members with them.
The Taliban may even benefit from the TTP’s presence in Afghanistan. They treat them and other militant groups operating from Afghan soil as allies to meet potential external aggression and obtain concessions, recognition, commercial ties, etc., from regional countries. The group is the Taliban’s leverage against Pakistan and Washington.
Did our security establishment miss something? They failed to see how much Afghanistan, and indeed Pakistan, changed, following the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973, because of the Soviet invasion, America’s two Afghan wars and the war on terrorism, and Pakistan’s strategic ambitions. And how Pakistan’s jihadist currents mingled with the militant groups and transnational terrorist networks produced by these wars and the global Islamist revival. All this led to the creation of the Taliban who, in time, became the flagship of the extremist network in the region.
As an insurgent group, the Taliban’s dependency on Pakistan gave Islamabad false hope that they would remain compliant even as a government. It may have worked the first time but Pakistan incurred reputational and diplomatic damage for questionable benefits. Much has changed since.
The Afghanistan of 2021 was not the same as when the
Taliban first came to power. The Taliban have greater internal challenges now and more international acceptance, and thus different priorities. Nor is it the same Pakistan, which is struggling on multiple fronts. This has necessitated a different approach by the Taliban towards Pakistan and the region. Thanks to their shrewd diplomacy, countries, including India and Iran who opposed the Taliban the first time, have been anxious to connect with them this time. The Taliban have been successfully cultivating a network of allies including China.
The Taliban won’t act against the TTP. Pakistan itself will have to do it. Kinetic measures are necessary but not enough. They should be an adjunct to political action that must be taken to address the grievances of disaffected groups among the Pakhtun and Baloch communities. The TTP needs to be politically isolated from these communities, which can only be done by addressing their grievances via increased socioeconomic opportunities, reduced political marginalisation, and better governance.