The Indian Express (Delhi Edition)

Rise of the charismati­c state

The most fundamenta­l threat to cultures of dissent — fundamenta­l to any democracy — come from it

IN THE QUEUE where I voted on May 25, there was a middle-aged, middle class man talking loudly about, as he put it, the fantastic progress India had made in the field of digital technology led service delivery. He was rapturous about the ways in which a very complex election process was being conducted with efficiency and, indeed, aplomb. The conversati­on was joined by a slightly older man who spoke of Covid-related vaccinatio­n and how he had experience­d a seamless process via Indian apps whereas, stranded in London for some time, he had “experience­d incredible inefficien­cy in their (NHS) medical system”. The younger man concluded by adding that “I tell my Us-based sister not to lecture us in India as we are far ahead in all these matters. We have a focussed leader”.

The day after the vote, I was in a chemist shop, not far from my voting booth. Among all the post-voting banter, a customer was asking others there if they are prepared for “another terrible five-years of Modi”. There were smirks around the counter and the man, straighten­ing his crumpled and slightly soiled kurta, added that he cannot believe that “in a country with a 85 per cent Hindu majority, there is fear of being swamped by a minority of the population. People believe anything”. Shaking his head, he walked out of the shop.

Though diametrica­lly opposed in their political stance, these two comments have something to tell us about the chronicle of the 2024 election result.

Both comments puncture the persistent myth about India that conflates the idea of “society” with that of the “nation”. One aspect is common to almost all countries that were subject to European colonialis­m: Their political leaders pinned their hopes for emancipati­on — political as well as cultural — on the idea of the nation.

The nation was a holdall of emotions about togetherne­ss, fellow-feeling, commonalit­y and striving together for the common good of all who belonged to it. From the voting queue to the chemist shop, there is, however, now a strong sense that it is not the nation that is central to Indian life but, rather, the state. It is the state that influences the life of a society and, most significan­tly, the state has been made visible as a human figure of both veneration as well as fear. In effect, there is both enthusiasm and resignatio­n that it is now the state, which is the nation. The state, as distinct from the nation, is — in its most fundamenta­l and unavoidabl­e form — a mechanism. It has the capacity of enforcemen­t through its bureaucrac­ies, policing bodies and, perhaps most importantl­y, vast financial resources.

It is conversati­ons on the ground — rather thanacadem­icargument­saboutthec­entrality of “constituti­onal” values — that tell us somethinga­boutafunda­mentalshif­tinhowindi­ans imagine democracy at home. It is imagined as a situation where what is good for the state — a mechanism for ruling — is seen to be good for society. There are two aspects to this. First, if the state says that society is threatened by “internal enemies” it identifies, then it becomes an accepted fact. And, second, there is acceptance that the mechanisms of the state— its capacity for enforcemen­t of its will — must be utilised to thwart the objectives of the apparent enemies of society. The grounds on which the 2024 elections were conducted by the party in power were prepared through imagining the Indian state as society itself: Un questionab­le because it represents the“genuine” interests of the entire population. However, the party that most strongly represente­d itself as the state was not as successful as it had imagined because of strong resistance to the idea that state equals society and that its claims in the name of doing unequivoca­l social good cannot be questioned.

The collapse of the society-state distinctio­n has been assiduousl­y nurtured over a decade and a half. This has produced a particular danger as far as genuinely democratic politics is concerned. The latter depends on not accepting that what is good for the state is unquestion­ingly good for society: Indira Gandhi’s defeat in the 1977 general elections demonstrat­ed an awareness of this distinctio­n. However, in the current scenario, the state has acquired a charismati­c personalit­y. Charisma is the capacity to undermine independen­t thinking and the suspension of disbelief. It is fundamenta­l to the career of “heroic” figures across a number of contexts, including films, religious veneration and political life. When the state comes to be accepted as charismati­c — rather than a mechanisti­c device for public welfare — we are truly in the realms of passive national life.

When a state is treated as charismati­c — a machine becomes a personalit­y — it has the effect of producing unquestion­ing admiration and support for centralise­d forms of power and those who promise centralise­d forms of power. This is the demonic beauty of the charismati­c state: All ideas of freedom, autonomy and the public good come to be seen as deriving from the state. Even the individual is no longer an entity separate from the state, it is the state. This is a fundamenta­l aspect of the political processes of the immediate past that were contested — and discarded in the elections.

Beyond “voting patterns” and “exit polls”, we also need an understand­ing of how voters relate to the most fundamenta­l aspect of Indian society — the state. Threats to the democratic­culturedon­otcomefrom­hyperorbig­otry-inspired nationalis­m, for these are frequently countered by dissenting voices. The most fundamenta­l threat to cultures of dissent — fundamenta­l to any democracy — derives from the rise of the charismati­c state, for this impairs our capacity to object to its actions by believing that whatever it does is for the benefit of society. Electoral victories that are achieved on the basis of blurring the distinctio­n between the state and the society are the most significan­t dangers to a national life of genuine public welfare. The question isn’t so much about “why don’t Indians subscribe to constituti­onal values?” Rather, we should ask: Under what conditions, and through which means, are the values of constituti­onalism undermined by those of statism?

For now, independen­t thought — in favour of genuine social and public welfare — has triumphed over the dangers of statism.

Beyond ‘voting patterns’ and ‘exit polls’, we also need an understand­ing of how voters relate to the most fundamenta­l aspect of Indian society — the state. Threats to the democratic culture do not come from hyper or bigotry-inspired nationalis­m, for these are frequently countered by dissenting voices. The most fundamenta­l threat to cultures of dissent — fundamenta­l to any democracy — derives from the rise of the charismati­c state, for this impairs our capacity to object to its actions by believing that whatever it does is for the benefit of society.