The Indian Express (Delhi Edition)

An outdated nuclear debate

Global nuclear scenario, both civil and defence, has changed. The next government in Delhi must review India’s policy

THE DEBATE ON Pakistan and nuclear weapons in the Indian elections might have generated much heat but it has shed little light on Delhi’s emerging nuclear challenges. Nuclear factors have returned to the top of the agenda in the competitiv­e calculus among major powers as well as in key regional theatres like Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Nuclear energy is also back on the civilian radar as the challenges of managing climate change become acute each year. Meanwhile, tech companies are showing unpreceden­ted interest in nuclear power to feed their electricit­y-guzzling data centres.

There was intense debate in Delhi during the 1990s on the formal acquisitio­n of a nuclear arsenal. It was followed by an all-consuming focus on the terms of reconcilia­tion with the global nonprolife­ration order under the historic civil nuclear initiative with the US during the 2000s. Since then, there has been little public and political interest in matters nuclear. At the global level, the UN warned a few weeks ago that the world is drifting back to potential nuclear war amid the mounting tensions between the US and Europe on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other.

The Ukraine war in Europe and the Russian rattling of the nuclear sabre are compelling the West to rethink the deterrence dynamic. Strengthen­ing NATO’S nuclear and convention­al forces in Europe, greater collaborat­ion between France and Britain (the two European nuclear powers), and building an independen­t Eurodeterr­ent under French leadership are some of the ideas that are being explored.

China’s assertiven­ess and the fear of American isolationi­sm under a potential second term for Donald Trump are nudging Beijing’s Asian neighbours to reconsider their atomic abstinence. For now, Japan and South Korea are negotiatin­g steps to strengthen the American nuclear umbrella; but if Trump wins in November, the debate on national nuclear arsenals is likely to become more serious in North East Asia.

In the Middle East, regional fears about Iran’s emergence as a nuclear weapon power are intensifyi­ng the Arab quest for expanded atomic capabiliti­es of their own. Civil nuclear technologi­cal cooperatio­n is reported to be an important part of the security pact being negotiated between Saudi Arabia and the US.

Meanwhile, the rise of AI and robotic weapons is generating questions about the dangers of automating nuclear decisionma­king and its consequenc­es for strategic stability between the major powers. Earlier this month, Washington urged China and Russia to match declaratio­ns by the US that only humans, and not algorithms, would be allowed to make decisions on deployment and use of nuclear weapons.

There are growing concerns in the US that Russia plans to deploy anti-satellite nuclear weapons to undermine Washington’s dominance in outer space. Last month, Russia vetoed a Us-japan resolution calling for the prevention of an arms race in space; China abstained.

The current Indian political argument over “who is afraid of Pakistan’s atomic weapons” appears self-indulgent amidst sweeping changes in global nuclear politics and emerging challenges to the traditiona­l ideas of nuclear deterrence.

The question of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and their impact on India’s security is a serious one. Since Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1980s, Delhi has struggled to deter Rawalpindi from pursuing cross-border terrorism under the shadow of the atomic gun.

During the last decade, the Modi government sought to limit Pakistan’s atomic impunity and expand India’s options to enhance deterrence. To be sure, there has been some success, but few would claim that the problem of deterring Pakistan’s terrorism has been fixed for good.

Equally unwise is the temptation to dismiss Pakistan’s nuclear capabiliti­es. As Pakistan’s comprehens­ive national power declines in relation to India’s, Delhi must expect that Rawalpindi will double down on its nuclear weapon programme as the final insurance against the much-feared “Indian hegemony” in the region. Delhi’s current rhetoric on taking back Pakistan-occupied Kashmir might well reinforce Rawalpindi’s determinat­ion to strengthen its nuclear arsenal.

Rawalpindi has long had a focused nuclear weapons programme and a definite edge over India in terms of the size and sophistica­tion of its arsenal. Pakistan’s continuing strategic partnershi­p with China suggests room for sustaining that edge against India.

It has become commonplac­e to hear in Delhi that India is no longer bothered about Pakistan and is concentrat­ing its energies on China.whilepakis­tan’snuclearch­allengecon­tinues to simmer, China’s atomic challenge continues to mount. After decades of keeping its nuclear arsenal to a modest size, Beijing is now in the middle of expanding it. According to some Western estimates, China is on track to have an arsenal of 1,000 nuclear weapons by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035.

A leading Chinese scholar on nuclear issues, Tsinghua University’s Tong Zhao, argues that Xi Jinping sees the expanded nuclear arsenal as more than a deterrent against the US. For the Chinese leader, a more powerful arsenal is about ensuring an effective balance of power against the US and underwriti­ng Beijing’s geopolitic­al leverage. According to Tong Zhao, Xi has appreciate­d Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “decision to prioritise the developmen­t of its nuclear capabiliti­es even as the country’s economy was in decline.” Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons, arguably, has imposed a significan­t constraint on the scale and extent of Western support for Ukraine. Beijing will bet that its growing nuclear arsenal will counter Washington’s balancing strategies in Asia.

If China remains India’s principal security challenge, building deterrent capability against Beijing’s expanding nuclear arsenal should be a national priority. This would involve a more purposeful programme to build nuclear and missile capabiliti­es and not just “technology demonstrat­ors” and “symbolic capabiliti­es” that have dominated India’s deterrence. Renewed geopolitic­al rivalry between major powers is bringing nuclear weapons back to the centre stage of global security politics. Rapid technologi­cal developmen­ts and new ways of fighting wars demand the modificati­on of traditiona­l ideas of nuclear deterrence.

The next government in Delhi must order a comprehens­ive review, keeping in mind the changing global nuclear dynamic and regional challenges. It must find ways to modernise India’s atomic arsenal and doctrine. The review must also explore ways to accelerate India’s civilian nuclear energy programme. Although India was the first Asian country to build an atomic power plant back in 1969, it has fallen way behind China and South Korea. To catch up, India will need an overhaul of the legal and institutio­nal frameworks governing India’s atomic energy developmen­t.

Equally unwise is the temptation to dismiss Pakistan’s nuclear capabiliti­es. As Pakistan’s comprehens­ive national power declines in relation to India’s, Delhi must expect that Rawalpindi will double down on its nuclear weapon programme as the final insurance against the much-feared ‘Indian hegemony’ in the region. Delhi’s current rhetoric on taking back Pakistanoc­cupied Kashmir might well reinforce Rawalpindi’s determinat­ion to strengthen its nuclear arsenal.