Reading the tea leaves ahead of China’s Third Plenum
There is some hope that the plenum might point to a change in direction for China
Commentators in the West have been stating for some time that it was time to move beyond the rosy vision of a postCold War world, as, according to them, Moscow and Beijing (and certain other states aligned with them) could no longer be expected to become responsible stakeholders within a rulesbased international order. Against this backdrop, considerable attention is being devoted to the Third Plenum of China’s 20th
Party Congress for signs of a possible thaw. There is a lingering hope that the plenum, scheduled to be held from July 1518, might signify a shift in policy and a change in direction, at least as far as China is concerned. Pessimism is, nevertheless, rife in the West that China would ever subscribe to the idea that the security of every country is intimately linked to the security of the other. Yet, China is well known to spring surprises.
Meantime, a belief exists in the West that China had ‘peaked’ economically following its disastrous ‘Zero COVID’ policy. Also, that China’s economy is still in terminal decline. Hence, the plenum might well pave the way for a change in direction, unlikely though it might look as of now. There is, thus, considerable interest, all around, about the eventual outcome of the plenum.
Economic reforms, issues
The fact that the date of the Third Plenum has been advanced this time — it normally takes place in October or November of the year following the standard Five Year Party Congress interval — has spurred this speculation that China is contemplating sweeping reforms to ensure China’s rapid progress in the period ahead. Third Plenums typically set the economic strategy for the next five to 10 years, and are generally viewed as the most crucial Plenum in the Central Committee’s fiveyear cycle. Across the world, many still recall that it was at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978 that Deng Xiaoping unveiled a whole new range of economic reforms that set China on the path of economic resurgence.
That China has economic problems is not denied: an ageing population, shrinking workforce, high levels of debt, and an economy that is still facing problems, notwithstanding the measures that have been put in place. This has given rise to a great deal of pessimism within China itself about its future. Hopes are high that the Plenum will come out with certain new guidelines that would at least convey an impression to the people and the world outside that China’s economy is in good shape.
It has been a long time since any meeting devoted almost entirely to economic reforms has been programmed by the leaders of China’s Communist Party. Most outside experts, however, are uncertain whether the plenum would indeed provide China an opportunity to experiment with new ideas. Further, that the current leadership would do so. Understandably, China’s ‘Maximum Leader’, Xi Jinping, is hardly in a position to repeat what Deng Xiaoping said at the plenum in 1978 (which was held after Mao’s demise), that China had been 30% wrong, though 70% right. This would amount to an admission of failure on Mr. Xi’s part, which could impact his future.
The view about China’s ‘intentions’
The West’s drumbeat of allegations against China is, meanwhile, set to continue. Notwithstanding the outcome of the plenum deliberations, they will convince themselves that China’s ‘gray zone coercion’ tactics are likely to continue. Activities such as ‘disinformation’ campaigns, interference in elections in democracies, military provocations in the seas around China, within and outside the First and Second Island Chains, the threat to Taiwan and countries in the South and East China Seas will, they claim, remain. Taiwan would also continue to remain the centrepiece of China’s military and propaganda offensive.
Countries in Asia in particular, may, therefore, need to contend specifically with the threat posed by a mix of Chinese values, cultural expansionism, and national security paranoia. China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) well encompass many of China’s beliefs, leaving little scope for any adjustment. Having elevated the issue of national security to the highest level, Mr. Xi in turn sees danger everywhere. And this increases the paranoia about China’s intentions in Asia, as also elsewhere.
China’s approach is, thus, likely to add a great deal of ‘flux’ to an already difficult regional and global situation. It could also pose a dilemma for India’s policymakers. For many years now, and more so since 2020, India’s relations with China have remained under deep strain. This is not solely due to the tense situation prevailing on the ChinaIndia border, but has been the catalyst. As far as the border is concerned, the Chinese still demonstrate little ‘give’, despite India indicating a willingness to show more flexibility.
The result of all this is that both China and India appear to be hardening their attitudes. Already, reams are being written in India about the size of Beijing’s growing missile and nuclear inventory. China’s approach to the deployment of dual capability missiles is being adversely commented upon. Members from India’s strategic community also continue to draw attention to the danger posed by China’s Rocket Force (which oversees its nuclear and conventional missiles), and about the advances made by China in space and electronic warfare. The broad hint is that India should prepare for the worst, and take adequate steps in the event of a confrontation.
The issue, therefore, is whether a confrontation is inevitable, or whether an attempt could be made to deflect China’s ‘evil intentions’ through diplomacy and other means. This has no relationship to the relative difference in China’s and India’s force structure, and is intended, at best, to avoid any misadventure through wrong signalling. There is no hint forthcoming, that China would respond positively to such overtures, given China’s hard line stance and its aggressive mien. This is, however, as good a time as any for any experimentation, given that the economic and the strategic consequences of a conflict would be grim for both countries.
Where India stands
Today, India is far better positioned than China to take such an initiative. It is on the cusp of becoming a ‘major’ from a ‘middle level’ power. Its economic parameters are among the best in the world at present. It has a strong and focused leadership and has friends across the spectrum in all corners of the world. An initiative on India’s part at this time would not be seen as a sign of weakness; it would be tantamount to a major initiative in favour of world peace. In the long history of ChinaIndia rivalry and conflict, from the early 1960s till date, there have been many periods when India has taken the initiative, and on occasions with spectacular outcomes. In the realm of diplomacy, place names such as Sumdorong Chu and Wangdung still reverberate. In terms of grand initiatives, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s pathbreaking visit to China in 1988 and his discussions with Deng Xiaoping at the time, ensured almost three decades of peace for India and the world.
The situation today is again less tense than during many periods in the past. ‘Peace is not at hand’, but India today holds a stronger card, vis-à-vis China, than at any time in modern history. Mr. Xi invoking a relevance to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel by India) in Beijing (to mark the 70th anniversary of the Panchsheel) could well provide the opportunity for India to embark on a grand new initiative. It is India’s choice to do this or not. What is certain is that to have a successful result would be highly beneficial for India and China, Asia and the world.