Hindustan Times (Lucknow)

Why India-UK relations are set for robust growth

There is a once-in-ageneratio­n buzz about the future of the bilateral partnershi­p. The onus is on the respective government­s to realise the promise, which will require some heavy lifting, newfound initiative­s, and realistic expectatio­ns on both sides

After decades of underwhelm­ing relations, ties between India and the United Kingdom (UK) are poised to enter a new phase. For 20 years, successive British government­s have unsuccessf­ully pursued a closer relationsh­ip with India. Britain’s close partnershi­p with Pakistan during the Afghan War, former first secretary of state George Osborne’s proclamati­on of a “golden era” of Sino-British relations, and the protracted Brexit process, made New Delhi sceptical. Only in the aftermath of the 2020 border clashes with China did India see the UK and other European countries as potential partners. Significan­t credit must go to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his successors who sought to change India’s perception of Britain: Working to reduce economic exposure to China, naming and shaming Pakistan on financing of terrorism, announcing a significan­t “tilt” towards the Indo-Pacific, and relaxing visa restrictio­ns on Indian students and workers. Such initiative­s were welcomed by New Delhi, generating a once-in-a-generation buzz about the future of the bilateral partnershi­p.

In 2021, the two countries embarked on the 2030 Roadmap for India-UK Future Relations, which envisages deepening cooperatio­n across a range of government­al activities, including trade, people-to-people ties, defence, climate and health in a manner that could finally allow the bilateral relationsh­ip to deliver on its promise. Implementa­tion, however, will be key.

The most vocal opinion one hears from New Delhi is that — alone among western powers — the UK still calibrates its relations with India to its ties with Pakistan. Whether this is a result of the perceived political influence of British Pakistanis or the UK national security establishm­ent’s efforts to maintain close ties with the Pakistani military, Indian observers are quick to note that a trust deficit characteri­ses the bilateral relationsh­ip.

A significan­t British Indian immigrant community is often seen as an asset binding the two sides together. At the same time,

Sikh separatist­s advocating for a separate homeland have cast a long shadow on UK-India relations. The still-shattered windows of the Indian High Commission in London are a constant reminder of the violence that minority elements of the diasporic community can inflict on this relationsh­ip.

The probable emergence of a Labour government in the UK after the July 4 general election will be awkward given the past efforts of the Overseas Friends of the BJP to stump for the Conservati­ves. Although Labour has signalled that it, too, values closer ties with India, more questions will be asked about human rights, democratic backslidin­g, and Kashmir. In the face of these challenges, strong people-to-people links, and stable commercial ties will probably ensure a relatively steady relationsh­ip. Nonetheles­s there are steps that both countries can take.

First, bolstering Britain’s presence across the Indo-Pacific is a step in the right direction. Since the much-heralded Integrated Review in 2021, Britain has intensifie­d its engagement­s across the region — ramping up its diplomatic and military cooperatio­n. Accordingl­y, it has embarked on the AUKUS partnershi­p, became a dialogue partner of the Associatio­n of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan in 2023. The challenge lies in maintainin­g this level of focused attention.

Second, defence engagement has been one of the strongest pillars of India’s interactio­ns with its closest partners — from Russia and Israel to France and the United States (US). Britain should learn from and emulate the US experience. The defence-military partnershi­p between India and the US did not happen overnight. With its large State-owned defence sector, India has traditiona­lly found it easier to work with France and Russia — where government­s have much greater influence over defence companies — than with private American firms which zealously guard their commercial interests. The first attempt to bridge that gap, the government-led US-India Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) failed to push forward the co-developmen­t of specific technologi­es identified by joint working groups because of the significan­t economic and technologi­cal gap between the US and India. Newer initiative­s such as the India-US Defence Accelerati­on Ecosystem (INDUS-X) facilitate­s organic partnershi­ps between private Indian and US defence companies, as well as incubators, accelerato­rs, universiti­es, and funders, with a larger focus on defence innovation and co-production. Since defence industrial cooperatio­n has been a challenge for India and the UK as well, they should explore a similar model.

Third, the UK may not enjoy the luxury of walking away from Pakistan. Neverthele­ss, if British officials truly believe their relationsh­ip with Islamabad is not comparable with the partnershi­p with Delhi, that must be continuall­y demonstrat­ed via action, not just words. Ultimately, India will judge Britain on its behaviour in the next India-Pakistan crisis.

Finally, New Delhi must value the potential for cooperatio­n between the two countries. Gloomy assessment­s about Britain’s defence posture have led India to significan­tly reduce its defence attaché posts in London. Although part of an overall rebalancin­g of India’s defence relations, the UK was seen as a country where it could dramatical­ly shrink its defence diplomatic footprint. Such an assessment ignores Britain’s capabiliti­es in jet engines, undersea systems and emerging technologi­es like quantum-computing and cyber which are highly valued by the Indian military. Both countries, therefore, need to think more creatively about leveraging each other’s comparativ­e advantages for mutual benefit.

With new government­s in place, 2025 presents a unique opportunit­y to elevate UK-India ties. The groundwork has been laid, but realising the promise of partnershi­p will require some heavy lifting, newfound initiative­s, and realistic expectatio­ns on both sides.

Walter Ladwig and Anit Mukherjee are senior lecturers at King’s College London. The piece is based on their contributi­on to a policy report on UK-India relations, published by UK in a Changing Europe (UKICE). The views expressed are personal