Safety report calls Kanchanjunga Express crash an ‘accident in waiting’, blames systemic failures
The Commissioner of Railway Safety (CRS) has termed the Kanchanjunga Express crash that killed 10 people an “accident in waiting” and attributed the incident to systemic failures in managing train operations within automatic signal zones when there is a defect in signalling equipment, and insufficient training of railway personnel.
In its preliminary findings, a copy of which has been seen by HT, CRS also found that an incorrect paper authority (basically an order issued in writing when a signal is defective) issued to the driver of a goods train that rammed into Kanchanjunga Express was the trigger for the accident.
This order was not “complete” CRS said, because it did not mention the “maximum permissible speed” of the train.
According to CRS, the same order was given to seven trains that passed the section where the defective signal was , with each of the loco pilots following a different speed. The only one following the rule was the pilot of the express train, who kept the speed to 15 kmph and also stopped at one of signals on the stretch as he was expected to.
As a result, the good train, travelling at high speed, rammed into the stationary express. The accident took place at about 8.55am on June 17 around 10km from New Jalpaiguri station in north Bengal. The Kanchanjunga Express, which originated in Agartala, was headed to Sealdah station in Kolkata when the goods train hit it.
Apart from the 10 deaths including that of the goods train driver, a total of 43 people were injured (10 seriously injured and 33 with minor injuries), the report of CRS added.
A spokesperson for Indian Railways said the issue has been remedied now. The order has been “changed so that there is no possibility of misinterpretation”, he added, pointing out that training of loco pilots has been “strengthened” and the “authority forms of various zones standardised”. The spokesperson further said that Railways is working with RDSO ( Research Design and Standards Organisation) to “increase the reliability of signalling equipment”.
The report also stated that since this was a major signalling failure involving multiple signals, the operating department should have followed a different provision.
But the spokesperson also highlighted that this was a human error. “Unfortunately, the loco pilot of the goods train did not interpret the authority properly. However, the loco pilot of Kanchanjunga train had interpreted it correctly and had stopped at the red signal”
The CRS report also highlighted the importance of Kavach — Railways’ own indigenous Automatic
Train Protection (ATP) System [TCAS: Train Collision Avoidance system] with an aim to aid loco pilots to avoid signal passing at danger (SPAD), over speeding and train running during inclement weather such as dense fog. Kavach works when two trains running on the same track are feared to have either a head-on collision or a rear end collision.
“...as many as 208 cases of Signal Passing at Danger from April 1, 2019 March 31, 2024 out of which 12 cases resulted in collision, highlights the limitations of preventive measures taken by the Zonal Railways (counselling of loco pilots / assistant loco pilots, safety drivers etc)..this underscores the need for KAVACH on top priority”.
It also pointed to the shortage of walkie talkie sets to all train drivers and managers which needs to be provided.
The Kanchanjunga drivers had the sets but the goods train drivers were not issued the sets on the accident day. The CRS report also recommended that the control office at the divisional level should be staffed around the clock by a senior section engineer, a junior engineer, and one helper in eighthours shifts. At the time of the accident, the signalling control office was manned only by a technician.