A fundamental rift in Israel
After Hamas’ October 7 attack, Israel’s intention was to annihilate the group, or at least cripple it to the point that it could no longer conduct offensive operations or pose a future threat. Israel’s warfighting plan was to pursue Hamas with infantry and air forces wherever it went. The problem was that Hamas was concentrated in civilian areas.
Hamas’ decision to locate among the local population was based on the belief that the defensive party gains a double advantage in urban warfare. First, in urban environments the defender benefits from knowing the terrain, including the best places to ambush the attacker, for whom the terrain is alien. Second, the presence of civilians inevitably complicates the attacking force’s operations, effectively shielding the defender to some extent. Large numbers of civilian casualties offered Hamas an additional political advantage. The ability to attrit the attacking enemy is obviously desirable, but Hamas’ most powerful weapon was international public opinion, which was concerned less with how the war started but appalled at the consequences and held Israel responsible for them. There is political value in global sentiment opposing your enemy.
However, Israel did not halt its offensive. The war Cabinet was focused on total victory, which would render international opinion irrelevant. To cripple Hamas, Israeli forces had to operate in urban areas, where precise targeting is practically impossible. Hamas forces deliberately resisted and remained in place while absorbing casualties. Israel remained committed to outlasting Hamas, but Hamas did not break.
This has led to a surprising development: A senior member of the Israel Defense Forces publicly stated that Hamas cannot be defeated. The IDF’s top spokesman, Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, told an Israeli broadcaster: “To say that we are going to make Hamas disappear is to throw sand in people’s eyes. If we don’t provide an alternative, in the end, we will have Hamas. … Hamas is an ideology, and we cannot eliminate an ideology.” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected the remarks. A statement from his office noted that the IDF’s war aims include “destroying the military and governing capabilities of Hamas.”
Essentially, the army spokesman’s statement portrayed Hamas as Israel sees itself. Zionism is an ideology that believes in Jews having their own nation. The problem with Hamas’ ideology is that, in addition to wanting a state, it openly opposes the existence of Israel. This is where the military reality intervenes.
Israel has not defeated Hamas, and nothing that has happened in recent months should offer hope that the group can be defeated over time. Israel defeated Egypt and Syria in 1973, but they were ordinary states that calculated the benefits and costs. An ideology is a monochrome concept in which there is victory or death.
A senior member of the IDF has thus issued a warning. It is unlikely he is alone. Netanyahu is certain he can crush the enemy, but now he also has to restore order among his own troops. How can he do both?