Financial Mirror (Cyprus)

Disruption­s to undersea cables

This kind of infrastruc­ture is uniquely vulnerable to attack

Unconfirme­d reports from Israeli media suggest that underwater data cables near Yemen in the Red Sea – the AAE-1, Seacom, Europe India Gateway and TGN systems – have been damaged. So far, only Seacom has confirmed interrupte­d service.

The reports come a few weeks after Houthi rebels, who have already attacked shipping vessels in the region in solidarity with Hamas, threatened to sabotage undersea cable routes. And yet the cause of the damage remains unconfirme­d; neither the Houthis nor any other party has claimed responsibi­lity.

The episode comes amid increased concerns in Europe over the security of subsea cables. The European Commission released a report on Feb. 21 recommendi­ng that all member states assess the vulnerabil­ity of undersea cables and take steps to protect them.

But the concerns go back much further. In 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that his government would take seriously any potential attack on underwater telecommun­ications infrastruc­ture. He even broached the topic during an impromptu meeting of EU leaders right after the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was damaged.

He may have been on to something. Though most discussion­s over the collateral damage of the Gaza war and the war in Ukraine tend to focus on energy infrastruc­ture and satellites, the recent incident shows that undersea cables are relatively easy to attack and that any damage done to them can carry dramatic consequenc­es.

Some 16 undersea cables traverse the Bab el-Mandeb strait, which is 26 kilometers at its narrowest point. The cables here are essential in connecting three continents – Europe, Asia and Africa – and each serves a specific function for the telecommun­ications sector. The AAE-1 (Asia-Africa-Europe-1) connects Southeast Asia and China to Europe through the Middle East and Egypt. It transmits huge amounts of data between these regions, making it vital for economic and communicat­ion links.

The EIG (Europe India Gateway) directly connects Europe and India, offering a critical high-bandwidth route for data exchange and internet traffic between these regions. The Seacom cable system connects Europe, Africa and India, providing crucial internet and communicat­ion infrastruc­ture while also serving as a vital link for South Africa. The TGN (Tata Global Network), while technicall­y not a separate system, is a partnershi­p between Seacom and Tata Communicat­ions using the same cable infrastruc­ture as Seacom and plays a similar role as Seacom in connecting Europe, Africa and India.

One of the biggest “benefits” to attacking these cables is that it’s practicall­y impossible to see whether they’ve been damaged in real time. The effects may be felt only by end consumers, who experience slower internet speeds, higher latency and intermitte­nt outages.

For example, network engineers quoted in the Israeli reports note that one of the cables, EIG, has been “down for weeks.” Seacom reportedly said on Feb. 26 that damage to its cable that operates between Kenya and Egypt caused internet connection disruption­s in Djibouti for two days. Again, at the time of writing, the damage has not been independen­tly confirmed.

It’s unclear how quickly the cables can be repaired. Seacom has already said that maintenanc­e and repair activities are difficult, given the location of the subsea cable and the tensions in the area. Indeed, repairs are notoriousl­y time-consuming: The broken portion must be found and removed before it can be reconnecte­d, and the fleet of ships capable of making repairs is usually booked in advance for routine maintenanc­e. Good luck finding one that will be eager to sail into an active war zone.

To be clear, this isn’t just a matter of someone not being able to stream their favorite show online. Disrupting cables also affects financial transactio­ns between regions, potentiall­y hurting internatio­nal trade and investment. It can also result in delays in settlement­s and increased costs. Then there is the matter of potential supply chain disruption. Businesses that rely on these cables for communicat­ion and data transfer in their supply chains may face delays that will likely impact delivery times and potentiall­y lead to stock shortages.

Though it is still unclear what exactly caused the slowdowns, industry reports can shed some light. Historical­ly, the most common cause of disruption to undersea cables is human error – anchoring, fishing activities and the like. The data on hostile operations is not well establishe­d, but risk scenarios have been considered. Subsea cable landing stations, where the cable emerges and links to land-based infrastruc­ture, are typically placed on beaches or in cities and are thus a potential weak spot.

Attackers may target cable landing sites through espionage, purposeful power outages, explosive sabotage or even missile assaults in the event of a kinetic war. Having single points of failure, such as the concentrat­ion of cables in a single route or a lack of variety of routes, increases the possibilit­y of a concerted assault on numerous cables and puts pressure on repair capacity.

In sum, an investigat­ion is unlikely to yield much informatio­n on the cause of the current damage. In addition to sabotage by state or non-state actors, other potential threats include accidental harm from fishing gear, ship anchors or natural events like submarine landslides. Either way, the incident highlights the importance of redundancy in subsea cable infrastruc­ture, especially given our increasing reliance on subsea cables for communicat­ion, data transfer and economic activities.

Looking beyond the current conflict in and around the Red Sea, the potential for major disruption is clear. Globally, the most significan­t subsea cable systems are those that connect the most developed economies: the trans-Atlantic, trans-Pacific and intra-Asia or Eurasia systems.

The trans-Atlantic connection relies on two systems: the

Atlantic Cable System (ACS), which was laid in 1858, becoming the first successful trans-Atlantic telegraph cable, and the America Europe Connect-1 and 2 (AEC-1 and AEC2), a significan­tly younger network with a much higher capacity. In the Pacific, one of the most important links is the Asia-America Gateway Cable System, which connects Southeast Asia and the mainland United States, with stops in Guam and Hawaii. Another is the recently activated JUNO system, which boasts the highest capacity among the transPacif­ic links and ties together the U.S., Japan, Guam and Singapore.

The most important Eurasian connection is the FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) system, previously known as Fiber-optic Link Around the Globe (FLAG). FEA has landing points in 13 countries across Europe, Asia and Africa, covering a vast distance of approximat­ely 28,000 kilometers, making it one of the longest submarine cable systems in the world.

Naturally, this route traverses some geopolitic­ally tense areas, so it has duplicates – including one, the Europe-India Gateway, that was reportedly damaged in the Red Sea. Even longer is the 2Africa system, which spans more than 45,000 kilometers and connects 33 countries in Africa, Europe and Asia. This network almost completely encircles Africa and extends into the Persian Gulf before landing in Mumbai, highlighti­ng the growing importance of the Global South in the global economy.

Subsea cables are critically important. They already carry more than 97 percent of internet traffic. And with the growth of digital communicat­ion and exchange as well as the rise of countries in the Global South, their significan­ce will only increase. At the same time, geopolitic­al tensions are heightenin­g fears that these cables could suffer deliberate attacks or become collateral damage, especially as potential bad actors learn more about their vulnerabil­ities. While technologi­cal improvemen­ts have made informatio­n transmissi­on simpler, they have also made it easier for state and non-state actors alike to target subsea cables to interrupt or alter their performanc­e.